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THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL POLICY
TOWARD INTERNET AND SPORTS WAGERING AND
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
ANTHONY CABOT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports wagering, although mostly illegal, exists albeit narrowly
and proves to be big business in the United States. Currently, the
federal law governing sports wagering distinguishes between animal
races and human athletic contests. Both events, however, draw ea-
ger bettors and raise enormous monetary stakes. The amount wa-
gered by wealthy clientele on horseracing and human athletic
contests is truly staggering.
Thoroughbred racing, which involves skilled human jockeys,
has become the most popular animal race wager. While bettors wa-
ger over $12 billion each year on the "ponies," thoroughbred hor-
seracing wagering is on the decline.' According to one report:
"Wagering on U.S. races was down $1.35 billion to $12,319,129,673
in 2009, a percentage drop of 9.9%. Hurt by the overall ailing
economy, as well as industry-specific issues, the decline represents
the sharpest drop in more than 25 years."2 However, one of the few
bright spots for horseracing has been the increase in advance de-
posit wagering. This type of wager allows players to deposit money
on account with a track or off-track betting facility and remotely
place bets on horses by telephone or Internet. Of the total handle
(i.e. amount wagered) in 2009, about 14% was placed online
through advance deposit wagering, which is about equal to the
amount of wagering that now occurs at the track.3 The other re-
* J.D., Arizona State University College of Law (1981). Anthony N. Cabot is
currently the chair of the gaming law practice at Lewis & Roca. He is the past
president of the International Masters of Gaming Law, past president of the Ne-
vada Gaming Attorneys Association, and past general counsel to the International
Association of Gaming Attorneys.
1. See Frank Angst, Another Billion-dollar Decline in Wagering, THOROUGHBRED
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-news/2010/
January/06/Wagering-on-US-races-dips-in-December.aspx (reporting that wager-
ing on horseracing amounted to over $12,000,000 in 2009).
2. Id.
3. See Ray Paulick, Was Churchill Acquisition A Smart Move? YOUBET, PAULICK
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maining race wagers are placed at other race tracks, off-track bet-
ting facilities, and over the Internet.4
Sports wagering in the realm of human athletic contests in-
cludes both team and individual competitions. Determining the
amount wagered on these sporting events is difficult because virtu-
ally all wagering is done illegally by bookies, who rarely keep open
books or pay taxes. When the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission ("NGISC") issued its Final Report in 1999, its estimate
of illegal sports gambling ranged as high as $380 billion annually.5
The most popular human sport for wagering is professional and
college football, estimated annually at $80-100 billion and $60-70
billion, respectively.6 Less than 1% of all sports wagering on
human athletic events is done legally. In 2008, the total amount
wagered in Nevada at the nation's only legal sports books was $2.57
billion, up from $2.27 billion in 1998.7 For the calendar year 2009,
the total net revenue realized by these operations was $136.4 mil-
lion, excluding wagering on horseracing. 8 These books won an av-
erage of 5.31 percent of each bet placed.
This Article discusses the disparate treatment of these two cate-
gories of sporting events under federal law, the contradiction in
public policies and why and how implementation of federal law has
failed. Furthermore, this Article concludes with a proposal for a
new model for dealing with sports wagering, particularly over the
Internet.
4. See Anthony N. Cabot & Eugene Christiansen, Why the Future of Horseracing
is at Risk: The WTO Decision and Senator Ky4 9 GAMING L. REV. 201, 201-10 (2005)
(describing where horseracing bets are placed).
5. See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ch. 2 at 14
(1999) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html [hereinafter
NGISC FINAL REPORT] ("Estimates of the scope of illegal sports betting in the
United States range anywhere from $80 billion to $380 billion annually, making
sports betting the most widespread and popular form of gambling in America.").
6. SeeJim McDermott, All Bets Are Not Off on Superbowl Sunday, ROLL CALL, Feb.
4, 2010, available at http://www.rollcall.com/news/42994-1.html (describing esti-
mate of $80-$100 million in NFL wagers annually); see Top Sports for Illegal Wa-
gering, CNBC.coM, http://www.cnbc.com/id/34312813?slide=4 (last visited April
20, 2010) (noting estimated $60-$70 billion annual wagers for college football).
The Big Business of Illegal Gambling, CNBC, December 2009, available at http://
www.cnbc.com/id/34039744.
7. See NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BOARD, GAMING REVENUE REPORT 4 (2008)
available at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/lg_08dec.pdf (summarizing
gambling revenue for 2008).
8. See NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BOARD, GAMING REVENUE REPORT 4 (2009)
available at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/lg_09dec.pdf (summarizing
gambling revenue for 2009).
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II. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST SPORTS WAGERING ARE
RARELY ENFORCED
Despite the enormous amount wagered illegally every year, the
United States has lapsed into a general approach of non-enforce-
ment of illegal sports wagering laws, both at the state and federal
level. Law enforcement efforts to deal with illegal sports wagering
have declined dramatically in the past twenty years.9 In 1960, al-
most 123,000 arrests were made for illegal gambling. 10 FBI arrest
statistics reveal that all gambling arrests in the United States have
steadily declined since 1994 and totaled less than 10,000 in 2008.11
In contrast, the number of illegally wagered dollars has increased
dramatically. In 1983, only $8 billion were wagered on sports in the
United States compared to an estimated $380 billion in 2009.12
Many factors have contributed to this decline in arrests. First,
law enforcement has reallocated its limited resources to more seri-
ous crimes. Second, federal laws and prosecutorial policies have
become increasingly confusing and contradictory. Therefore, pros-
ecutors may be less anxious to test the laws in fear of creating bad
precedence. Third, the penalties assessed against those who violate
betting laws are generally low, and often do not justify the time or
expense of law enforcement. Fourth, improvements in technology
have made it more difficult to detect and prosecute offenders. At-
tempting to apprehend and prosecute gambling operators in for-
eign countries is often a challenge. Fifth, the public does not
perceive gambling as a serious crime or even a crime at all: office
pools on sporting events, such as the NCAA basketball tournament
and the NFL Super Bowl, flourish. Championship games are fre-
quently marked by "friendly" bets between governors. 13 Finally, the
9. See Robert Dorr, With Police Mostly Sidelined, Sports Bettors Run Up the Score,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 31, 1999, at la, available at 1999 WL 4486468 (ex-
plaining decline in law enforcement efforts over past twenty years).
10. See Dan McGraw, The National Bet, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 7, 1997,
at 50 (noting gambling arrests in 1960).
11. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, EASY ACCESS TO FBI ARREST
STATISTICS: 1994-2007, available at http://ojdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/ (pro-
viding easy access to arrest statistics). The actual figures for 1994 were 18,500 gam-
bling arrests. See id. The number reached 21,000 in 1996, but has decreased to
12,200 by 2007. See id. In contrast, there were almost 2 million arrests for drug
abuse violations in 2007. See id. In 2008, the FBI estimated that there were 9,811
gambling arrests in the United States. See Table 29 - Crime in the United States,
FBI.coM, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_29.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2010).
12. See FBI.coM, supra note 11.
13. See Victoria Advocate, Jindel Sends Saints Flag to Indiana Governor,
VicroR1AADvocATE.coM, Feb. 11, 2010 available at http://www.victoriaadvocate.
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media has contributed to the public perception of sports gambling
as an enjoyable and legal pastime. For example, wagering on fan-
tasy sports is widespread. Additionally, the NGISC claimed, albeit
somewhat incredibly, that because point spreads are available in al-
most every major U.S. newspaper, many people do not know that
sports wagering is illegal) 4 The fact that newspapers post point
spreads shows that the public enjoys wagering on sporting events.
Because most states have laws against sports wagering, law enforce-
ment is placed in the uncomfortable position of enforcing laws that
are unpopular with the public.
The media infused public misconception of sports gambling as
lawful is a disturbing trend, particularly, because citizens can lose
respect for the government if the laws are not popularly supported
or enforced.' 5 Disrespect for the law due to non-enforcement also
may occur where people adopt an attitude that not all laws need to
be taken seriously. For example, the attempt to ban alcohol con-
sumption in the United States in the 1920s resulted in a conflict
between the society and the law. The government ultimately recog-
nized the futility of the attempt because of strong commercial de-
mand.' 6 This resulted, however, in the first widespread incident
where the public openly defied the laws. The effect that this has
had on law enforcement is untold. Moreover, non-enforcement
may lead the public to believe that the police are corrupt. A na-
tional study concluded that "citizens are very likely to view non-en-
forcement of gambling laws as an indication of police
corruption."'17
com/news/2010/feb/11/bc-la-super-bowl-governors-bet/ (noting Super Bowl bet
between state governors).
14. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 (describing public's lack of
awareness that sports betting is illegal).
15. See PATRICIA HELSING, COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POL-
ICY TowARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING - THE ISSUES AND POLICY DECISIONS INVOLVED IN
THE TREND TowARD LEGALIZATION - A STATEMENT OF THE CURRENT AND CHRONISM
OF BENIGN PROHIBITION app. 1 at 773 (1976), available at https://dspace.ucalgary.
ca/bitstream/1880/41368/2/appendixl.pdf (explaining why gambling laws must
be properly enforced).
16. See William Eadington, Issues and Trends in World Gaming, in Symposium,
Gambling in Canada: Golden Goose or Trojan Horse? (British Columbia: Simon Fraser
University, 1989).
17. FLOYD J. FOWLER, THOMAS W. MANGIONE & FREDERICK E. PRAIIER, GAM-
BLING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES (National Institute of Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice 1978), .
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III. CURRENT FEDERAL POLICIES TOwARD SPORTS WAGERING ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH HISTORICAL FEDERAL
GAMBLING POLICY
Before politics superseded policy, historic federal policy to-
wards gambling was relatively simple. Rather than preempting the
state laws, federal gambling laws were designed to aid states in the
enforcement of their gambling laws. For example, under most fed-
eral law, a gambling business is illegal only if it violates a state or
local law.' 8 Specifically, when Congress adopted the Federal Wire
Act, it made clear its respect for the rights of individual states to
sanction gambling within their borders. 19 But, these historic gam-
bling laws dated to the early 1960s. Presently, the Federal Govern-
ment's approach towards gambling and sports wagering
demonstrates a marked departure from its historical approach.
This departure resulted from federal legislative efforts to dictate
gambling policy and attempts by the Executive Branch to adopt pol-
icies which would give the Department of Justice plenary authority
over all Internet gambling.
This change in policy, however, has not resulted in implemen-
tation of laws that effectuate clearly articulated policy positions. In-
stead, the current federal laws and positions are confusing and
often ambiguous. Congress is aware of this ambiguity: In passing
new laws to address Internet gambling, it has avoided adding lan-
guage that would determine whether Internet horse race gambling
is unlawful. Specifically, the law states "this subchapter is not in-
tended to resolve any existing disagreements over how to interpret
the relationship between the Interstate Horseracing Act and other
Federal statutes." 20 In effect, Congress is stating that it is incapable
of setting clear policy on federal criminal law. In such circum-
stances, it is unclear what a citizen is supposed to think about the
lawmaking process, and how a person or business would know what
is legal.
18. See United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. W. Va 1962). The
purpose" of the Wire Act " is succinctly stated in Report No. 588 of the Senate
Judiciary Committee of the 87th Congress, on July 24, 1961, as "* * * to assist the
several States in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling and to aid in
the suppression of organized gambling activities by restricting the use of wire com-
munication facilities." Id.
19. See H.R. Rep. No 87-967 (1961) (Congress did not intend to criminalize
acts that neither states nor Congress desired to be treated as criminal).
20. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006).
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IV. TREATING SPORTS WAGERING DIFFERENT FROM OTHER FORMS
OF GAMBLING
Besides the inherent ambiguity in federal gambling laws, in-
consistencies in treatment are difficult to justify based on public
policy considerations. This is evident when considering sports wa-
gering. When Congress adopted the Wire Act in 1960, both animal
races and human athletic contests were treated equally. Federal law
simply prohibited transmitting sports wagers of any kind across
state lines. This has since changed.
A. Wagering On Sporting Events Not Involving Horse Races Is
Treated As a National Problem
States' rights to decide their own policy towards gambling were
derailed in 1991 when Congress decided that the states could not
responsibly determine their own policies toward wagering on
human athletic contests. Specifically, Congress was concerned that
states were sanctioning gambling activities including lottery-type
games whose outcomes where based on actual sporting events. In
response to sports organizations' concerns, U.S. Senator Dennis
DeConcini (D-Arizona) introduced the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act ("PASPA") on February 22, 1991.21 Accord-
ing to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, the "bill serves an
important public purpose, to stop the spread of State-sponsored
sports gambling."22 Through PASPA, Congress asserted various
problems with sports wagering. The first concern addressed was
the potential impact on youth. According to U.S. Senator Bill Brad-
ley (D-New Jersey), a former NBA star, "[1] egalized sports betting
would teach young people how to gamble." 23 Senator Bradley be-
lieved that children attracted to sports would soon associate sports
with gambling, rather than with personal achievement or
sportsmanship. 24
Senator Bradley and others were also concerned that the
proliferation of sports wagering might harm both the integrity of
sports through game-fixing, as well as the fans' perception of that
integrity.25 For example, a player might fix a game by missing an
21. 137 CONG. REc. S2256-04 (1991).
22. S. REP. No. 102-248, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553.
23. Sen. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act - Policy
Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 7 (1992).
24. Id.
25. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Throwing The Game: Why Congress
Isn't Closing a Loophole That Fosters Gambling on College Sports - and Corrupts Them,
[Vol. 17: p. 271
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easy opportunity to score at the end of a game. Even if this did not
affect the game's outcome, it could impact the point spread, and,
ultimately, help win certain wagers. 26 Fans might then question the
player's true motivation behind missing the shot, asking themselves
whether the player was rigging the game or just fatigued. Senator
Bradley deemed legal, state-sponsored sports wagering to be the
most objectionable form of sports wagering because it created the
perception that the government approved of wagering on sporting
events. As Senator Bradley stated, sports wagering puts the "impri-
matur of the state on this activity." 27
PASPA prohibits states from legalizing schemes or contests
where the winner is determined based on the outcome of any pro-
fessional or amateur sports event or the individual performance of
any athlete in those events. 28 PASPA also bans any person from
advertising, pursuant to state law or compact, any gambling or wa-
gering scheme based on the outcome of any professional or ama-
teur sports event or the individual performance of any athlete in
those events. Because some states had pre-existing sports wagering
TIMEMAG.COM, Sept. 25. 2000, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,55103-1,00.html.
26. See What Is A Point Spread or Side Bet, THE SPREAD.COM, http://
www.thespread.com/sports-betting/what-is-a-point-spread-or-side-bet-point-spread-
explained-definition-be.html (last visited April 21, 2010) (explaining how point
spreads work). A point spread is the amount of points that one team is favored
over another. See id. With a point spread, a gambler who bets on team X may still
win his wager so long as team X does not lose by more points than the spread. See
id.
27. Bradley, supra note 23, at 5.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 3702. The heart of PASPA, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 3702,
reads:
It shall be unlawful for -
(1) a government entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, li-
cense, or authorize by law or compact, or
(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to
the law or compact of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes,
or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or
indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise),
on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or
more performances of such athletes in such games.
Id. A governmental entity means any state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, any Native American tribe, any other U.S.
territory, and any subdivision of these entities. See § 3701(2). The law creates an
unusual anomaly. See id. A person violates federal law if he operates a sports book
pursuant to state law, but not if he violates state law. See id. Moreover, the Act is
ambiguous as to whether it is unlawful for a private person to operate a sports
book or contest that is not authorized by state law, but does not violate any state
law. See id. The most obvious example is sports fantasy leagues, which decide re-
sults based on the performance of athletes. See id. Based on the legislative history,
these activities would not appear to violate the Act. See id.
277
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laws, exceptions were crafted to allow them to continue.2 9 By 1999,
however, only Oregon and Nevada had any form of legal sports wa-
gering. The Oregon lottery conducted a game called "Sports Ac-
tion," based on the outcome of professional football games,30 and
Nevada has almost 200 legal sports books that accept wagers on
many categories of amateur and professional sports. 3 1 In 1999, the
NGISC recommended that Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Mon-
tana lose their exemption for collegiate and amateur sporting
events. 32 The NCAA lobbied Congress to pass legislation banning
all betting on college and amateur sporting events. 33 Principally,
the NCAA argued that several factors make sports wagering on ama-
teur events more problematic than wagering on professional sports.
First, it asserted that student athletes are more susceptible to In-
ternet sports wagering because they have greater access to the In-
ternet.3 4 Second, amateur athletes are at risk because they are
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (noting exceptions to PASPA). Section 3704(1) pro-
vides that § 3702 does not apply to: "[A] lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting,
gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental en-
tity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State or other govern-
mental entity at any time during the period beginningJanuary 1, 1976, and ending
August 31, 1990." Id. As a result, Oregon, Nevada, Delaware, and Montana are
exempt from the federal prohibition against state-sponsored sports wagering. See
Dan Caesar, Sports Books in St. Louis? No Chance, Says a 1992 Law, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, July 12, 2001, at 36, available at 2001 WL 447141 (explaining special
exception in New Jersey). A special and peculiar exception to the Sports Protec-
tion Act was crafted for Atlantic City, New Jersey. See id. This exception was pecu-
liar because New Jersey law did not authorize the Atlantic City casinos to offer
sports wagering. See id. Nevertheless, to retain the exception, New Jersey had to
authorize such sports wagering within one year after passage of the Sports Protec-
tion Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a) (3) (A). New Jersey decided not to authorize
sports wagering and lost the exemption. See Caesar, supra.
30. Oregon Lottery.com, Sports Action, http://www.oregonlottery.org/
sports/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
31. See NEV. GAMING CONTROL BD., GAMING REVENUE REPORT (Jan. 4, 2010);
see generally ARNE K. LANG, SPORTS BETTING 101: MAKING SENSE OF THE BOOKIE Busi-
NESS AND THE BUSINESS OF BEATING THE BOOKIE (1992) (describing the business of
gambling). The most popular sports on which bets are wagered include football,
basketball, and baseball. See Lang, supra. Wagers are also accepted on hockey,
golf, auto racing, soccer, and other sports and athletic events. See id. The most
popular wagers are straight wagers, futures, and parlay cards. Straight wagers are
bets on the outcome of an individual game, usually adjusted according to an estab-
lished "point spread." See id. Futures wagers are made on various outcomes of a
season so that, for example, a player may bet that his or her favorite team will win
the World Series. See id. Parlay cards allow players to bet on multiple games at one
time; if the players' choices are all correct, they are paid higher odds. See id.
32. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, ch. 3 at 18.
33. See Tony Batt, NCAA Works to End to Sports Betting, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Oct.
11, 1999, at 1D, available at 1999 WL 9295064.
34. See The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing Before the S. Sub-
comm. on Tech. Terrorism and Gov't Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Bill Saum, Director of Gambling Activities, NCAA).
[Vol. 17: p. 271
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attracted to the aggressiveness and control that also characterize
problem gambling.35 Finally, because amateur athletes are unpaid,
they are more prone to wager on the games in which they partici-
pate, and thus, undermine the integrity of the sporting contest.36
Congress has not accepted either of these arguments, and, there-
fore, has not passed the recommended legislation.
More recently, several states have been exploring the possibil-
ity of legal sports wagering. Delaware took the step of authorizing
single-game wagering. This was quickly challenged by the National
Football League. A recent federal appellate court decision deter-
mined that Delaware was limited to only sports wagering that ex-
isted at the time of the enactment of PASPA. As Delaware only
permitted parlay card wagering on professional football, the court
held that PASPA limited it to such activity.37 Delaware is not, how-
ever, the only challenge to PASPA. Given the current economic
downturn, many states are seeking new ways to raise revenue, with-
out raising taxes. A New Jersey legislator recently filed a lawsuit in
March 2009 seeking to overturn PASPA, arguing the federal law is
unconstitutional because it treats four states differently than the
other states. Other states, including Iowa, Missouri, and Rhode Is-
land, also are sending a message to Congress that they would like
the ban lifted.
B. Horseracing Is Treated Differently Under The Law
Although horseracing is excluded from the PASPA prohibi-
tion, Congress has decided to intervene in this sport in a much dif-
ferent way. Specifically, it has decided to control the economics of
the sport to assure that a portion of all interstate wagers are shared
between all stakeholders in the sport. Congress saw this as a
method to promote the stability of horseracing and off-track bet-
ting ("OTB") in the United States.38
Congress envisioned an interstate pari-mutuel scheme to en-
sure that states would "cooperate with one another in the accept-
35. See Steve Brisendine, NCAA Backs College Gambling Ban, AP ONLINE, June
19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17815684 (statement of Bill Saum, Director of Gam-
bling Activities, NCAA). This statement found support in the NGISC FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 5, ch. 3 at 10.
36. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, ch. 3 at 10.
37. PASPA may be subject to constitutional challenge because of the treat-
ment of the various states is not uniform under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity
Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REv. 249 (2005).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(b) (2001).
9
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ance of legal interstate wagering." 39 To this end, the original
version of the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA") prescribed rules
for "interstate off-track wagering," which Congress defined as a "le-
gal wager placed or accepted in one State with respect to the out-
come of a horserace taking place in another state. 40
The IHA now governs the relationship between the OTB oper-
ators, licensed Internet and interactive television horse race betting
services, the tracks, the horse owners and trainers, and the state
racing commissions concerning interstate wagers. 41 All other as-
pects of horseracing, such as licensing and policing, are left to the
discretion of the various state racing or gaming commissions. 42
Before an OTB operator can accept an interstate off-track wa-
ger, "consent" must be obtained from three parties: (1) the track,
the (2) racing commission in the state where the track is located,
and (3) the racing commission in the state where the OTB operator
is located.
The use of the word "consent" should not mask the true intent
of the Act. Consent comes with a price, either in the form of an
agreement to provide wire information or a simulcast, or to con-
duct pari-mutuel wagering. 43 As a practical matter, the OTB opera-
tor will negotiate a contract with the track to conduct wagering on
the track's races. This usually involves provisions for the merging of
pari-mutuel pools and the receipt by the OTB operator of the race
simulcast and instantaneous transmission of all tote (i.e., wagering)
and other track information.
The IHA has met its original intent of assuring that the tracks
receive a fair share of interstate wagers on races conducted at its
track. The respective rights of the OTB operator and the track are
well defined under the IHA. Once forced to the bargaining table,
both parties have relatively equal bargaining power because both
need the other to maximize profits. The Act also seeks to assure
39. 15 U.S.C. § 3001(2) (2001).
40. P.L. 95-515 (1978).
41. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-07 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Atlantic City Racing Ass'n v. Attorney General, 189 N.J. Super.
549, 461 A.2d 178 (1983) (holding that IHA did not preempt state law that prohib-
ited interstate pari-mutuel wagering).
43. The IHA does not, however, regulate wire information, disseminators or
simulcasts. See Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benev. & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v.
Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 F.3d 1406, 1412 n.10 (Ky. 1994) ("We reject
the appellee's claim that Congress was implicitly regulating the simulcasting of
horse races by regulating interstate off-track wagering because interstate off-track
wagering may occur without simulcasting, and simulcasting may occur without in-
terstate off-track wagering.").
[Vol. 17: p. 271
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that horsemen receive fair shares of interstate wagers by including
their consent as a "condition precedent" to the agreements.
What is striking between the PASPA and IHA is that both Acts
address sporting events with highly skilled athletes, but their treat-
ment is a dichotomy. In the case of horseracing, Congress shows no
concern for the impact of wagering on the integrity of the sport.
Instead, Congress' concern is to assure that the various stakeholders
in the sport are fairly compensated when persons accept wagers on
their events. No proof exists that horseracing is any more tainted
with scandal than other sports. The only difference is that the lob-
byists for the powerful professional sports leagues want a ban on
sports wagering that does not involve horses and the lobbyists for
the powerful horseracing industry want wagering on their sport.
V. THE HISTORICAL GAMBLING LAWS
The future of sports wagering, under IHA, PASPA and the
more recent Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
("UIGEA"), must be considered in light of historical gambling laws.
Three historic federal gambling laws apply to Internet wagers.
These are the Wire Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, the
Travel Act, and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act.
The proper application of these Acts requires consideration of both
human athletic contests and horseracing and whether these activi-
ties are occurring in intrastate (wholly within a state), interstate
(between two states), foreign commerce (between a state and a for-
eign country) or entirely outside the United States.
VI. THE WIRE ACT
The Wire Act, perhaps the most discussed law, includes the ma-
jor provision of Section 1084(a)), which provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wa-
gering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the trans-
mission of a wire communication which entitles the recipi-
ent to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers,
or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wa-
gers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
44
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2001).
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The Wire Act, in its entirety, reads poorly and in parts, the Act
is nearly incomprehensible. For example, subsection (a) is a single
sentence containing ninety-four words. In addition, the difference
between a "bet" and a "wager" is never explained and there is con-
fusion among clauses and definitions. The third subclause does not
make sense alone, so some wonder whether, despite commas, there
are only two subclauses. There is debate on whether the words "on
any sporting event or contest" area meant only to apply to the first
sub-clause or the other clauses as well. If the words were only
meant for the first sub-clause, why would Congress limit the illegal-
ity of transmitting actual wagers only to sporting events? What is
the difference between a sporting event and a sporting contest? Or,
was sporting meant to modify both event and contest? Why wasn't
the phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce" used to modify the
second and third sub-clauses? Many commentators and courts have
engaged in serious debate as to these and other questions regard-
ing this Act, but the real truth is that its intent was probably ob-
scured by its horrific drafting.
Aside from its poor construction, a few things can be derived
from this Act. In the context of sports wagering, it clearly applies to
persons in the business of accepting house-banked wagers on sport-
ing events. These individuals are generally referred to as bookies.
Under the Wire Act, no person or entity has ever been successfully
prosecuted under the Wire Act unless he/it was: (i) in the business
of accepting or laying off bets from customers on a regular basis45
45. See, e.g., United States v. Reeder, 614 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Truchinski, 393 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 104. The
case of United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324 (D.C.R.I. 1981) is instructive.
In that case, the Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of
Section 1084 to determine whether a large scale, sophisticated, bettor was "en-
gaged in the business of betting or wagering." Id. The evidence at trial established
that the defendant was a frequent, high-volume gambler with indications that he
also "laid off" bets, but no direct evidence existed that he accepted bets from
others. See id. The court noted that: "When such a [gambling] business exists is
not easy to determine. There are no sharp contours and the general term such as
'business,' and the present state of the law is indeed amorphous. The legislative
history does not help solve the problem at hand." Id. The court noted that a
person who "lays off" bets may not himself be accepting bets but rather seeking to
minimize losses. Id. After a detailed examination of the legislative history, the
Court stated:
This last quote [citing legislative history] does indicate that the business
of gambling is a bookmaking operation involved in the acceptance of bets
and laying off of bets. I conclude after considering all of the foregoing
legislative history, that Congress intended the business of gambling to
mean bookmaking, i.e., the taking and laying off of bets and not mere
betting. The provocative question is whether this is still the proper defini-
tion when the bettor wagers substantial sums and displays the sophistica-
tion of an expert in his knowledge of odds making. I conclude the statute
[Vol. 17: p. 271
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or (ii) engaged in knowingly providing betting or wagering infor-
mation to bookmakers or others engaged in illegal gaming activ-
ity. 4 6  Consistent with this interpretation, in United States v.
Southard,4 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed a jury instruction that a "mere bettor" is not engaged in
the business of wagering "regardless of the amount wagered. '48
The 2002 Jay Cohen case established the applicability of the
Wire Act to Internet sports wagering in foreign commerce. 49 Co-
hen operated an offshore betting company based in Antigua. Pa-
trons would establish and fund accounts with the company typically
through wire transfers. The company would only place bets "based
from" accounts in Antigua. However, the company would take tele-
phone calls and Internet communications from the United States
patrons where they would relay information on which bets the com-
pany should place using funds from their accounts. The court ad-
simply does not cover such a situation. I find that Congress never in-
tended to include a social bettor within the prohibition of the statute and
that Congress did not contemplate prohibiting the activities of mere bet-
ters, even where, as with Mr. Baborian, they bet large sums of money with
a great deal of sophistication. Indeed, I do not see how the statute could
be read otherwise. The government's interpretation of the statute would
make the implication of criminality turn on the expertise of the better
and the quantum of money waged. I submit that these factors are not
determinative of what constitutes a business.
Id. at 327-329. The court distinguished cases where individuals who lay off bets
were found guilty of violating §1084 by noting that those individuals either directly
accepted bets or worked closely with individuals who accepted bets illegally. In-
deed, the Court noted that Baborian's co-defendant Lauro, who accepted bets
from Baborian, was involved in the business of betting or wagering. See Id. at 331-
332.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Scarvo, 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979).
47. 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983),
48. The jury instruction provided the following:
Now, an individual engages in the business of betting or wagering if he
regularly performs a function which is an integral part of such business.
The individual need not be exclusively engaged in the business, nor must
he share in the profits or losses of the business. He may be an agent or an
employee for another person's business, but the function he performs
must provide a regular and essential contribution to that business. If an
individual performs only occasional or non-essential services or is a mere
bettor, regardless of the amount wagered, or customer, he cannot prop-
erly be said to engage in the business.
Id. at 21-22. (Emphasis added.)
49. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.).Jay Cohen, a U.S. citizen, was
convicted under the Wire Act (18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2001)) and a related New
York State Statute for his ownership and involvement in the World Sports Ex-
change ("WSEX"). See id. WSEX is an Antiguan company doing business in Anti-
gua, licensed in Antigua and Barbuda, that takes sports bets from anywhere in the
world. See id. Although Mr. Cohen has been sentenced, the WSEX site is still on-
line and apparently taking U.S. bets. See id.
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dressed the issue of whether the Wire Act applies when a sports
book, which is licensed in a foreign jurisdiction, takes wager infor-
mation from a U.S. patron by use of the Internet. Cohen main-
tained that the Wire Act should not apply because his business was
licensed in Antigua and all wagers were taken, recorded, and
processed in Antigua. The court, on appeal from his conviction,
held that the wagers take place both in the state where the bettor
resides and where the servers or service provider resides; therefore,
the bets took place in part in the U.S.50 Since the bets took place in
the U.S., the Wire Act applied and his conviction for violating the
Wire Act was upheld. The district court held that taking bets from
the U.S. in Antigua was the transmission in interstate commerce of
wagers and therefore the Wire Act was applicable and Cohen was
properly charged. Cohen's conviction was upheld on appeal, and
all arguments regarding the inapplicability of the Wire Act to such
circumstances were rejected.
The court, in Cohen, did not establish that all Internet sports
wagering was unlawful. The Wire Act would not appear to apply to
purely intrastate wagering as by its own terms; it only applies to in-
terstate or foreign commerce. In fact, intrastate telephone sports
wagering is and has been operational in Nevada for many years.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), in an effort to assert ple-
nary jurisdiction over all Internet wagering, regardless of whether
permitted under state law, has taken a broader definition of inter-
state commerce to include an Internet transmission that originates
and ends in the same state but where the routing of the message
crosses state line.51 This position is contrary to the very reason that
50. Id.
51. In testimony before the Congress, a DOJ representative noted:
[The pending bills also permit] "intrastate" wagering over the Internet
without examining the actual routing of the transmission to determine if
the wagering is "intrastate" versus "interstate." Under current law, the
actual routing of the transmission is of great importance in deciding if
the transmission is in interstate commerce. The department is concerned
that these two proposals would weaken existing law.
Letter from Bruce G. Ohr, Chief of Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,
Department ofJustice (April 5, 2006). This position was repeated in a letter to the
U.S. Virgin Islands Casino Control Commission, which was considering implemen-
tation of Internet gambling. The letter noted:
While several federal statutes are applicable in Internet gambling, the
principal statutes are sections 1084 and 1952 of Tide 18, ". . . [We] be-
lieve that the acceptance of wagers by gambling businesses located either
outside of the Virgin Islands or within the Virgin Islands (but where the
transmission is routed outside of the Virgin Islands) would itself violate
federal law.
Letter from U.S. Attorney David M. Nissman to Eileen R. Peterson, Chair of the
U.S. Virgin Islands Casino Control Commission (jan. 2, 2004). The DOJ has some
14
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Congress adopted the Wire Act, which was to assist the states in
enforcement of their own state policy toward gambling. This was
even acknowledged by the Justice Department. In testimony before
Congress, a DOJ representative stated:
That being said, 18 U.S.C. 1084 - the Wire Communica-
tions Act - currently prohibits someone in the business
of betting and wagering from using a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign com-
merce of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest.
This law was originally enacted to assist the states and terri-
tories in enforcing their laws and to suppress organized
crime involvement with gambling. 52
About the only type of Internet sports wagering that the Fed-
eral Government agrees is lawful is wagering that occurs wholly
outside the United States. This should not be confused with "for-
eign commerce" that under the Wire Act means commerce be-
tween a state or U.S. territory and a foreign country. Accordingly,
the Wire Act does not prohibit a United States company or individ-
ual from operating a sports wagering site outside the United States
that does not accept players physically located in the United States.
In the comments to the recently enacted regulations implementing
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, the Treasury De-
partment and the Federal Reserve Board noted that "fIt] ransactions
that are wholly outside the United States (i.e., when all parties and
financial transaction providers to the transaction are outside the
United States) would not violate [federal and state gambling]
laws." 53
A major question regarding the Wire Act is whether its general
prohibition applies to Internet horse race wagering, which unques-
support for its position in the context of illegal activity occurring over telephone
lines. See United States v Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999), cert denied
530 U.S. 1231 (2000) (Use of telephone - make threats in interstate despite
originating and concluding in same state), Yaquinta v. United States, 204 F. Supp.
276 (N.D. W.Va 1962) (establishing that illegal horse race betting, originating and
ending in West Virginia, violates Wire Act because routing through Ohio consti-
tutes interstate commerce); Mark Hichar, The Wire Act Should Not Be Used to Prohibit
Internet Gambling Carried Out Under the UIGEA Intrastate Wagering Exception, 13 GAM-
INc L. Rrv. & ECON. 106 (2009), at 13(2): 106-114 (noting that several problems
exist in applying Wire Act to purely intrastate activities).
52. Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Divi-
sion, Statement at the Subcommittee On Crime Committee On TheJudiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives, Concerning Gambling On The Internet (June 24,
1998).
53. Comments to Final Rule implementing the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act, page 21.
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tionably is a sport. At the time of its adoption, the answer was that
it did. Today, although the Wire Act has not been amended, the
answer is that the Act probably does not apply to Internet horserac-
ing which is legal in both the sending and receiving states. How
this came to be requires an understanding of a tortured legislative
path.
Before the passage of legislation in 2000, which specifically ad-
dressed Internet wagering on horses, several racetrack and OTB fa-
cilities conducted account wagering, including the New York
Racing Association (NYRA) and the six New York OTB corpora-
tions, which are quasi-government agencies. A second section of
the Wire Act, often referred to as the safe harbor provision, pro-
vides an exception to the general prohibition against interstate off-
track pari-mutuel wagering by allowing for "the transmission in in-
terstate or foreign commerce . . . of information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State
or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest
is legal into a State or foreign country in which betting is legal."5 4
The horse race industry took the position that when a person in
one state uses the telephone to transmit the bet that he wants to
place that this is information only because the actual bet takes place
at the track.55 They maintained that when a patron called to place
a wager, the patron was merely providing instructions to the opera-
tor to place a wager on his or her behalf with the track and the
actual placing of the bet or wager did not occur until the track ac-
cepted the wager. They maintained that this betting instruction was
simply information assisting in the placing of the bet, not the bet
itself.
This argument, however, was rejected in a case involving Jay
Cohen who was operating a licensed sports book in Antigua called
World Sports Exchange (WSE).56 A distinction, however, between
54. Section 1084(b). This exemption only applies to the transmission of "in-
formation assisting in the placing of bets," not to the transmission of (1) bets or
wagers or (2) wire communications entitling the recipient to money or credit as a
result of bets or wagers. The exemption is further narrowed by its requirement
that the betting at issue be legal in both jurisdictions in which the transmission
occurs. Id.
55. See Heidi J. Seebauer, The Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978: An Evaluation,
12 CONN. L. REv. 883 (1980) (evaluating Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978).
56. See Cohen, 260 F.3d at 68. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, in
Cohen, that:
Cohen appeals the district court's instructions to the jury regarding what
constitutes a bet per se. Cohen argues that under WSE's account-wager-
ing system, the transmissions between WSE and its customers contained
only information that enabled WSE itself to place bets entirely from cus-
[Vol. 17: p. 271
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the Cohen facts and the position of the horseracing interests is the
tomer accounts located in Antigua. He argues that this fact was pre-
cluded by the district court's instructions. We find no error in those
instructions.
Judge Griesa repeatedly charged the jury as follows:
If there was a telephone call or an internet transmission between
New York and (WSE] in Antigua, and if a person in New York said or
signaled that he or she wanted to place a specified bet, and if a per-
son on an internet device or a telephone said or signaled that the bet
was accepted, this was the transmission of a bet within the meaning
of Section 1089. Congress clearly did not intend to have this statute
be made inapplicable because the party in a foreign gambling busi-
ness deemed or construed the transmission as only starting with an
employee in an internet mechanism located on the premises in the
foreign country.
Jury instructions are not improper simply because they resemble the con-
duct alleged to have occurred in a given case; nor were they improper in
this case. It was the Government's burden in this case to prove that some-
one in stew York signaled an offer to place a particular bet and that some-
one at WSE signaled an acceptance of that offer. The jury concluded that
the Government had carried that burden.
Most of the cases that Cohen cites in support of the proposition that WSE
did not transmit any bets involved problems pertaining either to proof of
the acceptance of transmitted bets, see United States v. Truesdale, 152
F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998), McOuesten v. 9teinmetz, 58 A. 876 (N.H. 1904),
Lescallett v. Commonwealth, 17 S.E. 546 (Va. 1893), or to proof of the
locus of a betting business for taxation purposes, see Saratoga Harness
Racing, Inc. v. City of Saratoga Springs, 55 A.D.2d 295 (App. Div. 1976).
No such problems existed in this case. This case was never about taxation,
and there can be no dispute regarding WSE's acceptance of customers'
bet requests. For example, a March 18, 1998 conversation between Spen-
cer Hanson, a WSE employee, and a New York-based undercover FBI
agent occurred as follows:
Agent: Can I place a bet right now?
Hanson: You can place a bet right now.
Agent: Alright, can you give me the line on the um, Penn State/
Georgia Tech game, it's the NIT [T]hird Round game tonight.
Hanson: Its [sic] Georgia Tech minus 711, total is 147.
Agent: Georgia [T)ech minus 71,1, umm I wanna take Georgia Tech.
Can I take 'em for 50?
Hanson: Sure.
WSE could only book the bets that its customers requested and author-
ized it to book. By making those requests and having them accepted,
WSE's customers were placing bets. So long as the customers' accounts
were in good standing, WSE accepted those bets as a matter of course.
Moreover, the issue is immaterial in light of the fact that betting is illegal
in New York. Section 1084(a) prohibits the transmission of information
assisting in the placing of bets as well as the transmission of bets them-
selves. This issue, therefore, pertains only to the applicability of
§ 1084(b)'s safe-harbor provision. As we have noted, that safe harbor ex-
cludes not only the transmission of bets, but also the transmission of bet-
ting information to or from ajurisdiction in which betting is illegal. As a
result, that provision is inapplicable here even if WSE had only ever trans-
mitted betting information,
17
Cabot: The Absence of a Comprehensive Federal Policy toward Internet and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
288 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 17: p. 271
IHA, which the horseracing interests allege was Congressional rec-
ognition of the legality of Interstate account wagering.
The debate over whether the Wire Act applied to interstate ac-
count wagering conducted by a state or a state licensed entity was
initially purely academic, as no prosecution was ever brought. The
question was no longer academic, however, when a DOJ representa-
tive appeared at a 1999 Congressional hearing that was debating a
controversial bill to extend the Wire Act to Internet gambling. The
representative stated the DOJ's position that the multi-billion dollar
OTB horseracing industry was illegal. Obviously, the horseracing
industry disagreed. As a direct result of that controversy, the hor-
seracing interests solicited the help of Kentucky Senator McCon-
nell, a Republican, to "fix" the law. The protectors of the sport, the
Kings of horseracing are not prone to partisan politics. The solu-
tion was to avoid the controversy with the Wire Act that was attend-
ant with the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act and to seek
clarification through an amendment to The Interstate Horseracing
Act of 1978. The amendment was buried in a massive appropria-
tions bill that passed in 2000. It clarified that pari-mutuel wagering
may be placed, via telephone or other electronic media (including
the Internet), and accepted by an off-track betting system where
such wagers are lawful in each state involved. 57 The new definition
of "inter-state off-track wager" is as follows:
"[I]nterstate off-track wager" means a legal wager placed
or accepted in one State with respect to the outcome of a
horserace taking place in another State and includes pari-
mutuel wagers, where lawful in each State involved, placed
or transmitted by an individual in one State via telephone
or other electronic media and accepted by an off-track
betting system in the same or another State, as well as the
combination of any pari-mutuel wagering pools. 58
The only relevant place in the IHA where the definition is used
is in Section 3003, which provides "No person may accept an inter-
state off-track wager except as provided in this chapter." While this
is hardly an unambiguous pronouncement of the legality of ac-
cepting an "interstate off-track wager," the legislative intent was
clear. During Congressional debate, Representative Harold Rogers
(R-Kentucky), then Chairman of the Appropriation Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, and State, stated the IHA amendment (in
57. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-07 (2000).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 3002 (2000).
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H.R. 4777) was specifically intended to "clarif[y] that the Interstate
Horseracing Act permits the continued merging of any wagering
pools and wagering activities conducted between individuals and
state-licensed and regulated off-track betting systems, whether such
wagers are conducted in person, via telephone, or other electronic
media."59 An electronic media communication would undoubtedly
include the Internet.
Yet in spite of the 2000 amendment, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice continues to take the position that the existing
prohibitions under the Federal Wire Wager Act were not affected. 60
The DOJ made this assertion as recently as May 2006 in another
Congressional hearing on the prospect of prohibiting Internet
gaming. In that hearing, a DOJ official stated:
The Department of Justice views the existing criminal stat-
utes as prohibiting the interstate transmission of bets or
wagers, including wagers on horse races. The Department
is currently undertaking a civil investigation relating to a
potential violation of law regarding this activity. We have
previously stated that we do not believe that the Interstate
Horseracing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007, amended the ex-
isting criminal statutes. H.R. 4777, however, would change
current law and amend Section 1084 to permit the inter-
state transmission of bets and wagers on horse races. H.R.
4777 also permits "intrastate" wagering over the Internet
without examining the actual routing of the transmission
to determine if the wagering is "intrastate" versus "inter-
59. Considering recognized rules of statutory construction, the Department
ofJustice continued position on account wagering does not make sense. There is a
presumption that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation. See
South Dakota v. Yankton, 522 U.S. 329, 351, 118 S. Ct. 789, 802 (1998). There is
also that presumption when it amends an existing statute. See In re Dobbins, 258
Cal. App. 2d 262, 270, 65 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (Cal. 1968). Case law has determined
that if two statutes conflict, the statute that was most recently enacted controls. See
Marschall v. City of Carson, 86 Nev. 107, 115, 464 P.2d 494, 500 (1970). In this
case, the IHA amendment was enacted after the Wire Act and therefore controls.
See Marschall, 86 Nev. at 107. To be sure Representative Rogers's comments evince
that the very purpose of amending the IHA was to clarify that account wagering is
legal and not within the purview of the Wire Act. See id.
60. Conference Report on H.R. 4942, District of Columbia Appropriations
Act, 2001, 146 Cong. Rec. H11265-02, at H11271 (2000). Despite what was an
unequivocal pronouncement that account wagering was legal pursuant to this
amendment, the Department of Justice still would not concede the legality of ac-
count wagering. In a press statement signing the IHA amendment into law, Presi-
dent Clinton commented that the Department ofJustice continued its position on
account wagering. See Press Statement by President William J. Clinton, Signing
H.R. 4942 into law (Dec. 27, 2000), available at 2000 WL 31157618.
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state." Under current law, the actual routing of the trans-
mission is of great importance in deciding if the
transmission is in interstate commerce. The Department is
concerned that these two proposals would weaken existing
law
We also are concerned that this bill would permit inter-
state wagering by the horse racing industry. Under H.R.
4777, other industries could only conduct intrastate wager-
ing. As expressed earlier, it is the Department's view that
the Interstate Horseracing Act did not change Section
1084. H.R. 4777, however, expressly permits interstate wa-
gering on horse racing. The Department questions why,
under the provisions of H.R. 4777, one industry will be
able to accept interstate wagers while other industries that
are also regulated by the states cannot.61
The position that the IHA amendment does not permit any
account wagering, however, is questionable. Under recognized
rules of statutory construction, the Department of Justice's contin-
ued position on account wagering has some substantial weaknesses.
A presumption exists that Congress is aware of existing law when it
passes legislation,62 and when it amends an existing statute. 63 As a
result, if two statutes conflict the statute most recently enacted legis-
lation controls. 64 In this case, the 11HA amendment was enacted af-
ter the Wire Act and therefore, IHA controls. Representative
Rogers's comments evince that the very purpose of amending the
IHA was to clarify that account wagering is legal and not within the
purview of the Wire Act. Therefore, a fair reading of existing fed-
eral statutes is that IHA specifically permits pari-mutuel wagering
on horse races in those instances outlined above, and the Wire Act
would not indirectly prohibit the same activities.
Another unfortunate aspect of the 2000 Amendment is that it
is inconsistent with the Wire Act. First, the Wire Act exemption
applies to any type of bet, not simply pari-mutuel bets. Second, the
Wire Act exemption extended to information assisting in the plac-
61. Concerning H.R. 4777, The "Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, "Before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement by Bruce G. Ohr, Chief Org. Crime and Racketeering
Sec., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
62. See South Dakota v. Yankton, 522 U.S. 329, 351 (1998).
63. See In re Dobbins, 258 Cal. App. 2d 262, 270, 65 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (Cal.
1968).
64. See Marschall v. City of Carson, 464 P.2d 494, 500 (1970).
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ing of a bet "from a State or foreign country where betting on that
sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in
which betting is legal," while the 2000 Amendment only referred to
wagers "transmitted by an individual in one State via telephone or
other electronic media and accepted by an off-track betting system
in the same or another State."
VII. A WVTO DECISION SEIZED UPON THIS POOR DRAFTING
In 2005, a World Trade Organization decision between the
United States and Antigua over trade obligations related to Internet
gambling generated significant publicity. 65 In short, the WTO case
was brought by Antigua based on commitments made by the United
States under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
This agreement sets out multilateral rules governing international
trade in services. The scope of what constitutes a service was in-
tended to be very broad. As part of GATS, the WTO members
made certain commitments reading the cross-border supply of ser-
vices. In particular, the United States agreed that with regard to
"recreational services," it would follow two principles: market access
and national treatment. Market access means that it will open its
markets to recreational services offered from another member
country and will not impose trade restraints such as numerical lim-
its. National treatment means that the United States agreed that it
would not treat another member country less favorably than it
treats its own suppliers of a like service.
An exception to market access and national treatment is mea-
sures that are adopted to protect the "public morals." According to
the WTO Secretariat, "[m]easures to curb obscenity or to prohibit
Internet gambling might well be justified on these grounds. '66 But,
what justifies the exception is pretty much uncharted territory in
trade law. 67
Against this backdrop, the WTO Appellate Body issued a final
ruling on April 9, 2005. Some findings are not debated. First, the
United States' commitment regarding recreational services in-
cluded gambling services. Second, certain U.S. laws including the
65. Footnotes 66 to 72 and the accompanying text originally appeared in an
article I co-authored in 2005. See Anthony N. Cabot and Eugene Christiansen, Why
the Future of Horseracing is at Risk: The WTO Decision and Senator Kyl, 9 GAMBLING L.
Rv. 201, 206-08 (Jun. 2005).
66. WTO Secretariat, The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (Nov.
16, 1998).
67. Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689,
694 (1998).
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Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act vio-
late GATS because they have the effect of placing numerical limits
on the number of services suppliers and operators and the quantity
of services output.
What the parties disagreed on is the very convoluted discussion
of the Public Morals exception. Here, the United States must show
that the prohibitions are necessary to protect the public morals and
that any reasonable regulatory alternative to prohibition put forth
by Antigua would not work. This was not fully played out in this
case because the Appellate Body found that Antigua failed to put
forth any regulatory alternatives.
The Appellate Body did, however, find that the United States
failed to disprove Antigua's claim that the Interstate Horse Racing
Act discriminated between foreign and domestic suppliers. 68 The
decision stated:
68. A portion of the text of that decision includes:
We now turn to the United States' Article 11 claim relating to the cha-
peau. The Panel examined the scope of application of the Interstate Hor-
seracing Act ("IHA"). Before the Panel, Antigua relied on the text of the
IHA, which provides that "[a]n interstate off-track wager may be accepted
by an off-track betting system" where consent is obtained from certain
organizations. Antigua referred the Panel in particular to the definition
given in the statute of "interstate off-track wager":
[T]he term . . . 'interstate off-track wager' means a legal wager
placed or accepted in one State with respect to the outcome of a
horserace taking place in another State and includes pari-mutuel wa-
gers, where lawful in each State involved, placed or transmitted by an
individual in one State via telephone or other electronic media and
accepted by an off-track betting system in the same or another State,
as well as the combination of any pari-mutuel wagering pools. (em-
phasis added)
Thus, according to Antigua, the IHA, on its face, authorizes domestic ser-
vice suppliers, but not foreign service suppliers, to offer remote betting
services in relation to certain horse races. To this extent, in Antigua's
view, the IHA "exempts" domestic service suppliers from the prohibitions
of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA.
The United States disagreed, claiming that the IHA - a civil statute -
cannot "repeal" the Wire Act, the Travel Act, or the IGBA-which are
criminal statutes - by implication, that is, merely by virtue of the IHA's
adoption subsequent to that of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
IGBA. Rather, under principles of statutory interpretation in the United
States, such a repeal could be effective only if done explicitly, which was
not the case with the IHA.
In our view, this aspect of the United States' appeal essentially challenges
the Panel's failure to accord sufficient weight to the evidence submitted
by the United States with respect to the relationship under United States
law between the IRA and the measures at issue.
In sum, we find that none of the challenges under Article 11 of the DSU
relating to the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS has succeeded.
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(O)ur conclusion ... relates solely to the possibility that
the IHA exempts only domestic suppliers of remote bet-
ting services for horse racing from the prohibitions of the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA,
So, while others argue the implications of the WTO ruling on
Internet casinos and poker, no one disagrees that a problem ex-
isted with regard to horseracing. Here is what Acting USTR Peter
Allegeier from the Office of the United States Trade Representative
said in its press release shortly after the ruling:
By reversing key aspects of a deeply flawed panel report,
the Appellate Body has affirmed that WTO Members can
protect the public from organized crime and other dan-
gers associated with Internet gambling," said in a prepared
statement.
This is also a victory for the federal and state law enforce-
ment officers and regulators who protect the public from
illegal gambling and its associated risks of money launder-
ing and organized crime.
U.S. restrictions on Internet gambling can be maintained
This report essentially says that if we clarify U.S. internet
gambling restrictions in certain ways, we'll be fine.
We explained that the only inconsistency that the Panel could have found
with the requirements of the chapeau stems from the fact that the United
States did not demonstrate that the prohibition embodied in the mea-
sures at issue applies to both foreign and domestic suppliers of remote
gambling services, notwithstanding the IHA - which, according to the
Panel, "does appear, on its face, to permit" domestic service suppliers to
supply remote betting services for horseracing. In other words, the
United States did not establish that the IRA does not alter the scope of
application of the challenged measures, particularly vis-a-vis domestic
suppliers of a specific type of remote gambling services. In this respect,
we wish to clarify that the Panel did not, and we do not, make a finding as
to whether the IlA does, in fact, permit domestic suppliers to provide
certain remote betting services that would otherwise be prohibited by the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and/or the IGBA.
Therefore, we modify the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.2(d) of the
Panel Report. We find, instead, that the United States has demonstrated
that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA fall within the scope of
paragraph (a) of Article XIV, but that it has not shown, in the light of the
IHA, that the prohibitions embodied in these measures are applied to
both foreign and domestic service suppliers of remote betting services for
horseracing. For this reason alone, we find that the United States has not
established that these measures satisfy the requirements of the chapeau.
Here, too, we uphold the Panel, but only in part.
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[The United States] "needs to clarify one narrow issue
concerning internet gambling on horse racing [and that it
will be] exploring possible avenues for addressing this
finding. USTR will not ask Congress to weaken U.S. re-
strictions on internet gambling. 69
A United States Trade Spokesman, Rich Mills, put it another
way: "We need to clarify one narrow issue, which is Internet gam-
bling and horseracing .... It doesn't necessarily mean loosening
restrictions. It could also mean tightening them. 70
VIII. REGARDLESS OF YOUR VIEWS TOWARD GAMBLING, THE WiE
ACT Is A TERRIBLE LAw
The general consensus on the interpretation of the Wire Act is
that it is narrowly constructed to only apply to bookies and does not
apply to casual bettors. Moreover, there is no dispute that the Act
does not apply to business conducted outside the United States
which does not accept bets from or otherwise communicate with
persons within the United States. Aside from that and indicative of
any rational attempt to decipher this abomination of the English
language, virtually every other interpretation of the Wire Act is dis-
puted. First, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the
Wire Act does not apply to any wagers other than sports. The De-
partment of Justice and one district court disagree. Second, some
states have implemented intrastate Internet or telephone wagering
presumably because the Wire Act applies to interstate and foreign
commerce. The Department of Justice disagrees. Third, the Ninth
Circuit and a district court have held that the Wire Act does not
apply to wagers lawfully made under state law. The Department of
Justice disagrees. Fourth, as will be discussed in the next section,
the horseracing industry maintains that the Wire Act does not apply
to pari-mutuel account wagering between states where it is legal.
The Department of Justice, of course, disagrees. Finally, these in-
consistencies have created trade disputes with other countries re-
sulting both in trade sanctions and the United States having to
attempt to withdraw trade obligations at considerable expense.
69. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. In-
ternet Gambling Restrictions Can Stand as U.S. Wins Key Issues in WTO Dispute
(April 7, 2005).
70. Declan McCullagh, WTO slams US. Net-Gambling Ban, CNET NEWS.COM,
Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://news.cnet.com/WTO-slams-U.S.-Net-gambling-
ban/2100-1030_3-5658636.html (emphasis added).
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IX. ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESSES ACT AND TRAVEL ACT
The Illegal Gambling Businesses Act ("IGBA") and the Travel
Act ("TA") are not plagued by the same problems as the Wire Act
because both were more clearly written and interpreted as being
consistent with legislative intent. Both Acts can potentially apply to
Internet sports wagering. But, both require a finding of a violation
of a state law as a predicate to a violation of federal law.
The Travel Act prohibits any person from using any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent to promote, man-
age, establish, carry on or facilitate unlawful activity. 7 1 Unlawful ac-
tivity is defined as "any business enterprise involving gambling" in
violation of state or federal laws. 72 Therefore a defendant using a
facility in interstate or foreign commerce for an activity deemed to
be in violation of state gambling laws could be simultaneously
deemed to violate the Travel Act.
The Illegal Gambling Business Act is similar. It prohibits any
person from conducting, financing, managing, supervising, di-
recting, or owning an illegal gambling business. 73 An illegal gam-
bling business is defined as an operation that violates state law,
involves five or more persons, and either is in substantially continu-
ous operation for more than 30 days or has a gross revenue of more
than $2,000 in any single day.7 4 Under the Illegal Gambling Busi-
ness Act, anyone who participates in a gambling business other
than a mere bettor may be subject to criminal liability under federal
law.7 5
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
72. Id. With respect to the federal law violation, because there are no com-
mon law crimes under United States law, the prosecution of the offender would
have to be based on a then existing federal statute. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. (prohibiting any person from conducting, financing, managing, su-
pervising, directing, owning or operating illegal gambling business); see also United
States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding that Section 1955
reaches both high level bosses and street level employees but subsequently, distin-
guishing on different grounds); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir.
1972) (vacating and remanding on other grounds); United States v. Ceraso, 467
F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1972). The issue is often what constitutes "managing," or "con-
ducting" an illegal gambling business. See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 592 F.2d
327, 328-29 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that for purposes of conducting illegal gam-
bling business, participation and not financial interest must be proven). "The
pleasure of participation and association in a gambling enterprise ... is sufficient
... [for a conviction under Section 1955]." Id. at 329 (emphasis added); See, e.g.,
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 (1978) (concluding that "conduct" can
be any degree of participation in illegal gambling business except participation as
customer). Most circuits have adopted a simple test: a person "conducts" a gam-
bling business if he or she performs any function that is "necessary or helpful in"
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More importantly, simplify being a patron is not facilitating the
gambling establishment under the IGBA. The Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing in Rewis v. United States76, noted that patronage by interstate
gamblers of a gambling establishment was not facilitating such gam-
bling establishment such that the gamblers themselves could be
charged with a violation of the Travel Act, and noted that the
United States Supreme Court expressly approved the position taken
on this issue by the Fifth Circuit.
Unlike the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act do not create substantial debate over their application
because in practice they remain consistent with the underlying fed-
eral policy to assist the states in enforcement of state gambling laws.
By specifically requiring a predicate state law violation, any doubt is
removed as to the ability of the state to set its own gambling poli-
cies. The Acts, however, are duplicitous. They do not seek to pro-
hibit different activities but simply provide two paths to prosecute
the same activity.
X. PATRIOT ACT
Although not specifically a gambling law, The Federal Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly
known as the USA Patriot Act ("Patriot Act"), is an existing law that
has direct relevance to Internet wagering. One section of the Pa-
triot Act prohibits certain money transmitting businesses. This pro-
hibition includes companies that transmit funds that are known to
have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be
used to be used to promote or support unlawful activity. The term
"money transmitting" includes transferring funds on behalf of the
the illegal business. Several cases have noted that the term conduct, as used in the
IGBA, is meant to apply generally to persons who participate in the day to day
ownership, management or conduct of the illegal gambling business, and includes
actions by both high level bosses as well as street level employees. See, e.g., United
States v. Merrell, 701 F.2d 53, 55 (6th Cir. 1983) (subsequently, distinguished on
different grounds). Under this analysis, virtually all, if not all, employees can be
indicted. See id. (a janitor that cleaned and straightened up a gambling room
"conducted" the gambling operation); see also United States v. Bennett, 563 F.2d
879, 883-84 (8th Cir. 1977) (a cocktail waitress in an illegal casino could be
deemed a participant). However, the Ninth Circuit's ruling regarding what consti-
tutes participation in a business would seem to indicate that general service provid-
ers would not count as one of the five participants in an illegal gambling business.
Likewise the Tenth Circuit found, in United States v. Boss, 671 F.2d 396 (10th Cir.
1982), that mere ownership of a building in which illegal activity is operated by
lessee cannot be held to be ownership of a gambling business, without further
proof of actual financial connections and participation in the gambling business.
76. Rewis v. United States, 418 F. 2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1969).
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public by any and all means including transfers within the U.S. or to
locations abroad.
While originally intended to provide tools to go after terrorist
organizations, the broad scope of the Patriot Act probably applies
to any online gambling payment solution provider that knowingly
assists in the transmission of funds from a U.S. player to an unlawful
gambling site. This provision would appear to directly apply to the
business facilitating payments between customers and online gam-
ing market merchants.
In fact, this provision has already been applied to Internet
gambling payment processing. In 2002, the U.S. Attorney's office
in Missouri alleged that PayPal had provided services between Octo-
ber 2001 and July 2002 to offshore sites in violation of this law and
the Wire Act. By allowing its users to transfer moneys by the PayPal
e-wallet to off-shore gaming sites and from the gambling sites back
to the users, PayPal allegedly violated the provision in the Patriot
Act that prohibits "the transmission of funds that are known to
been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to
promote or support unlawful activity."' 77 The U.S. Attorney's office
requested eBay, the parent company of PayPal, to repay nine
months of the gambling-related earnings in settlement, as well as
interest. In early 2003, eBay settled for $10 million, which repre-
sented what both parties agreed were forfeitable revenue that
PayPal obtained from processing the gambling transactions. Penal-
ties for violating this provision of the Patriot Act can be substantial,
including fines and up to 5 years in prison. This, however, is not
the only federal law that poses concern.
In January 2007, Neteller founders Stephen Lawrence and
John Lefebvre were arrested. 78 Both men were subsequently
charged with a money laundering conspiracy in accordance with
Section 1956 (a) (2) (A) of Title 18 of the United States Code
which specifically addresses anyone who "transports, transmits, or
transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary
instrument or funds.., with the intent to promote the carrying on
of specified unlawful activity. '7 9 The unlawful activities specified in
the Complaints were the operation of illegal gambling businesses in
77. See Todd R. Weiss, PayPal Cited for Patriot Act Violation, COMPUTERWORLD,
Apr. 1, 2003, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/110103/paypal-cited_
for-patriot act violation.html.
78. See Paritosh Bansal, NETeller Founder Pleads Guilty In Gambling Case,
REUTERS.COM, Jun. 29, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN2938127420070630.
79. 18 U.S.C § 1956(a) (2) (A).
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violation of U.S. Code Title 18 Section 1955 and the illegal trans-
mission of wagers and gambling information and violation of U.S.
Code Title 18 Section 1084.
Subsequently, the Neteller entity entered into a non-prosecu-
tion agreement with the government. Pursuant to the agreement,
Neteller consented to the filing with the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York of a criminal informa-
tion charging Neteller with participating in a conspiracy in violation
of certain United States laws. Specifically, the felony information
charged that Neteller participated in a conspiracy, in violation of
Title 18, Section 371 of the United States Code.80 Title 18 Section
371 of the United States Code provides the following:
(i) use the wires to transmit in interstate and foreign com-
merce bets and wagers on behalf of persons engaged in
the business of betting and wagering, in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1084; (ii) conduct illegal
gambling businesses, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1955; (iii) conduct international monetary
transactions for purposes of promoting illegal gambling,
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
1956(a) (2) (A); and (iv) conduct an unlicensed money
transmitting business, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1960.1
XII. UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT
The fourth major law that impacts Internet gambling is the Un-
lawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act ("UIGEA").82 Its pas-
sage may have changed the legal landscape for Internet sports
wagering. The heart of UIGEA is Sections 5363 and 5364, which
respectively contain the criminal prohibitions and the financial reg-
ulation provisions that make up the heart of the bill.
Understanding UIGEA requires understanding of the politics
and players beyond the bill. Some efforts were evident, while
others were clandestine. UIGEA was a culmination of eight years of
effort from Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona). Senator Kyl is generally
80. See id.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 371. "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
82. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 - 6367.
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associated with the evangelical movement in the Republican Party.
To give an indication of the power of this lobby, when Congress
commissioned the National Gambling Impact Study Commission,
four of nine commissioners were evangelicals including the Presi-
dent of Regent College and James Dobson himself. The evangelical
movement espouses a theocracy based on their vision of a Christian
nation. The basic political philosophy of the movement is catego-
rized under an umbrella: family values. Gambling, which is a histor-
ical vice, fails under the wrath of family values. Therefore, no
surprise exists that efforts to ban Internet gambling emanates from
Senator Kyl and the evangelical movement.
Historically, however, Senator Kyl ran into problems with pas-
sage. Principal opposition came from the horseracing industry,
state-run lotteries, and traditional casinos. Each has strong lobbies
in DC and wants exemptions to any prohibition.
The 2006 Congressional session had two competing bills intro-
duced both by conservative Republican Congressman: James Leach
(R-Iowa) (who worked with Kyl) introduced a criminal prohibition
while Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia) offered what was primarily a fi-
nancial services bill. Both made it through the House, but a pro-
tracted fight bogged both pieces of legislation in the Senate.
Coming into the last few months of Congress, a new player,
Senator Bill Frist then Senate majority leader, came onto the scene.
Frist took up the cause with the fervor of an evangelical minister.
Frist's motivation was simple; he wanted to be President. The issue
had two benefits. Point #7 of the evangelical movement's top ten
"family values" issues, as espoused by its House Leadership, targeted
Internet gambling along with the usual suspects: Anti-gay Marriage
Amendment, Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, Human Cloning
Prohibition Act, and the Pledge Protection Act. The second benefit
to Frist was that supporting Leach, who was from Iowa, could help a
presidential campaign where Iowa was so important.
The less likely ally of the evangelical movement was the Na-
tional Football League. Professional sports had a strong interest in
joining the battle - to protect the legality of fantasy sports. Two
motivations were evident. The first was preserving increasing reve-
nues that the sports leagues were charging to Internet sites that
were operating fantasy sports wagering. 3 The future of fantasy
83. At the time that the NFL was acting to preserve its licensing revenues, a
case was being decided that jeopardizes the leagues ability to charge fees to fantasy
leagues to use player statistics. In a decision from August of 2006, a federal district
court held that fantasy operators do not need to pay licensing fees to the sports
leagues to use the statistics of players in that league. C.B.C. Distribution and Mar-
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sports would have been placed in jeopardy if Congress passed In-
ternet gaming legislation that could have been read to prohibit fan-
tasy sports. The second was to maintain the increased viewership by
those that played fantasy sports.
Not surprisingly, the NFL played a major role in the passage of
UIGEA. According to a New York Post article:
the National Football League used a big bucks lobbyist to
ram through Internet gambling-curbing legislation in the
final minutes of the legislative session, sources revealed.
But opponents of the bill charge that the NFL broke the
rules when it fast-tracked legislation that never even got a
vote in the Senate - a trick play that provided a big exemp-
tion for fantasy football. The NFL runs its own fantasy
football site, and gets royalties from others.8 4
keting, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F.Supp.2d 1077
(E.D.Mo. 2006). This was a significant decision because the licensing fees gave the
sports leagues a direct interest in the success of the major fantasy leagues. See id.
Two major issues in the case involved a legal doctrine called "right of public-
ity" and whether the players' names and statistics are copyrightable. The right of
publicity is described in Section 46 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion (2005), Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The
Right of Publicity. This Restatement provision states that "[o]ne who appropriates
the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liabil-
ity .... See id. The court reasoned, in part, that:
[u]nlike cases where the commercial advantage element of the right of
publicity has been found, there is nothing about CBC's fantasy games
which suggests that any Major League baseball player is associated with
CBC's games or that any player endorses or sponsors the games in any
way. The use of names and playing records of Major League baseball
players in CBC's games, moreover, is not intended to attract customers
away from any other fantasy game provider because all fantasy game prov-
iders necessarily use names and playing records. Indeed, there is no evi-
dence to create a triable issue as to whether CBC intended to create an
impression that Major League baseball players are associated with its fan-
tasy baseball games or as to whether a reasonable person would be under
the impression that the baseball players are associated with CBC's fantasy
games any more than the players are associated with a newspaper
boxscore.
Id. The court concluded:
that the undisputed facts establish that the players do not have a right of
publicity in their names and playing records as used in CBC's fantasy
games and that CBC has not violated the players' claimed right of public-
ity. The court further finds, alternatively, that even if the players have a
claimed right of publicity, the First Amendment takes precedence over
such a right. The court further finds that the undisputed facts establish
that the names and playing records of Major League baseball players as
used in CBC's fantasy games are not copyrightable and, therefore, federal
copyright law does not preempt the players' claimed right of publicity.
Id.
84. Geoff Earle, NFL Makes Fantasy Pass, NEw YoRK POST, October 10, 2006.
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The same New York Post article went on to say:
[1]ast month, right before lawmakers left town to cam-
paign, the league was struggling for a way to overcome op-
position to clearing the gambling bill. The league
decided to try to tack the gambling bill onto final defense
legislation that couldn't be amended.... NFL Chairman
Roger Goodell and past chairman Paul Tagliabue wrote
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John
Warner (R-Va.) that the bill was an "achievement" he
could be proud of, but that couldn't get through the Sen-
ate by regular means. '85
The letter was referring to an attempt by Senator Bill Frist to
have the legislation attached to the Defense Appropriations bill
then being considered by a joint committee of the Senate and
House in the closing days before the 2006 fall adjournment. Sena-
tor Bill Warner (R-Virginia) rejected this attempt in a September
25th letter to Senator Frist that read, in part: "My strong objection
is based on the following precedents: Section 102 of S.2349, The
Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006 which
passed the Senate on May 23, 2006 clearly expresses the views of the
Senate that out-of-scope provisions are not to be included in confer-
ence reports."8 6
Undeterred by this rejection, Senator Frist turned to another
joint committee, this one considering the Port Safety Act. Unlike
Senator Warner, none of the members of the committee objected
to the inclusion of the amendment. Once attached, the full legisla-
tion went before Congress without the ability of its members to vote
against the amendment without voting against the entire bill. The
trick worked and the bill passed. Though Frist's presidential cam-
paign failed, this bill is an important part of his legacy.
The bill has two distinct provisions, largely because it consisted
of a last minute merger of two different bills. The first provision of
Section 5363 is criminal and is both relatively straight forward and
unnecessary. This provision provides that no person or corporation
engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly ac-
cept, in connection with the participation of another person in un-
lawful Internet gambling, virtually any type of payment including
credit, the proceeds of credit, credit card payments, electronic fund
85. Id.
86. Memorandum for Senator Bill First, from Senator John Warner, Septem-
ber 25, 2006.
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transfers or the proceeds there from, checks, drafts or similar in-
struments, or the proceeds from any other financial transaction as
specified by the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve by reg-
ulation. Penalties can include fines and imprisonment for up to
five years. The reason that this is unnecessary and has not been
controversial is that a person engaged in the business of accepting
illegal bets is already violating federal law. The person is merely
violating another statute.
Like the previously described Travel Act and Illegal Gambling
Business Act, UIGEA only applies to unlawful gambling, which is
defined as a bet or wager that is unlawful under any applicable state
law in the state in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or
otherwise made.
The standards appear identical to the existing law under the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act where federal
prosecutors need to show a violation of state law to be a violation of
federal law. The words of UIGEA, however, could be read more
favorable to the prosecution, which need only prove that the bet or
wager is unlawful under state law. For example, some states make it
unlawful for persons to play poker for money. These statutes would
not directly assess liability on a poker site because they are not play-
ers. The bets, however, are unlawful under state law. Therefore, an
Internet gambling site may be charged under UIGEA for accepting
the financial transfer, even if it does not directly violate the state
law.
Section 5364 has been more controversial. First, serious ques-
tion exists as to whether 5364 was even needed. The Department of
Justice was doing just fine under the Patriot Act. Second, serious
doubt still exists as to whether the intended regulatory scheme is
even workable. Under UIGEA, two agencies, the Federal Reserve
Board and the Department of the Treasury, had a nine-month pe-
riod (until July 2007) in which to enact regulations that would re-
quire any financial transaction provider, i.e. credit card companies,
banks, or stored value providers (like PayPal) to identify, code and
block restricted transactions. Restricted transactions are those
transactions where a gambling business accepts funds directly or in-
directly from a player in connection with unlawful Internet gam-
bling, i.e. unlawful under state law.
The agencies had four tasks in crafting the regulations. The
first was to identify types of policies and procedures that would be
reasonable to identify and block restricted transaction. The second
was to allow financial transaction providers ("ETPs") to choose al-
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ternative methods of blocking restricted transactions. The third
was to exempt certain restricted transactions of FTPs from a regula-
tion if the agencies found it is not reasonably practical to identify
and block such transactions. Finally, the agencies were tasked to
ensure that lawful Internet gambling, such as intrastate casino and
lottery wagers and interstate horse race wagers, was not blocked.
When the regulation finally came out in January 2009, the
agencies did not seek to directly implement the Congressional man-
dates. They determined that attempting to identify and block most
restricted transactions was not feasible. The agencies justified not
following the UIGEA mandates that individual transactions be iden-
tified, coded and blocked because the Automated Clearing House
(ACH), check cashing and other systems do not enable the exempt
participants to reasonably identify and block restricted transactions.
In its place, the agencies substituted a different scheme that focuses
on participants not transactions. This scheme focuses on the FTP
that has the relationship with the gambling business, or is the
United States FTP that deals directly or indirectly with the foreign
FTP that has the customer relationship with the gambling business.
These are the only FTPs not exempted from the regulations. For
example, in the check collection system, the non-exempt partici-
pant is the depository bank - more specifically the first U.S. insti-
tution to which a check is transferred whether from the gambling
business itself or a foreign bank or correspondent. This scheme
puts the burden on the first U.S. entity in the money chain coming
from outside the United States.
The regulation requires the non-exempt entities to conduct
due diligence and know their customer to assure that it is not in-
volved in restricted transactions. The result is that banks that work
with foreign banks must pressure the foreign banks to police their
own customers, and that non-exempt entities that deal directly with
gambling sites must know their own customer. An unknown factor
is how the non-exempt FTP will distinguish legal and illegal transac-
tions for the purpose of determining what is a restricted transac-
tion. This is often a nuanced determination that imposes a great
burden on the non-exempt entity.
To help elevate this burden, the regulations provided two dif-
ferent methods to determine if the customer was lawfully engaged
in gambling transactions. For a non-exempt financial institution to
provide financial services to a commercial customer engaging in
such Internet business, the commercial customer must provide the
financial institution with either a copy of a government-issued or
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tribe-issued license authorizing such activity or, if the customer
does not have such a license, a "reasoned legal opinion" that dem-
onstrates the commercial customer's Internet gambling business
does not involve restricted gambling transactions. Under the regu-
lation, a "reasoned legal opinion" means "a written expression of
professional judgment by a State-licensed attorney that addresses
the facts of a particular client's business and the legality of the cli-
ent's provision of its services to relevant customers in the relevant
jurisdictions under applicable federal and state law, and, in the case
of intra-tribal transactions, applicable tribal ordinances, tribal reso-
lutions, and Tribal-State compacts." Issuing a reasoned legal opin-
ion requires an attorney to fulfill these requirements of the
regulation while complying with the legal profession's guidelines
and standards for ethics and legal opinions.
The notion of identifying, coding and blocking specific trans-
actions envisioned to apply to all financial transactions was imposed
only on the credit card industry, which already has a system of iden-
tifying, coding and blocking merchant transactions for gambling
transactions. Likewise, the agencies did not address the mandate of
establishing procedures to assure that legal gambling transactions
are not blocked. These regulations, that were suppose to go into
effect on December 1, 2009, have been postponed and mandatory
compliance with the regulations of UIGEA was delayed untilJune 1,
2010.
XIII. REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES
Regardless of one's position on gambling, most would agree
that federal gambling law is an inappropriate approach. But, rea-
sonable alternatives exist.
First, the Wire Act, PASPA and UIGEA should be repealed.
Specifically, the Wire Act is comprehensible only to authors, who
have long been deceased and UIGEA adds nothing to the law and
has only created cost and confusion.
Second, Congress should implement one of several ap-
proaches. The first, most obvious approach, is to set gambling pol-
icy at the federal level in a meaningful, consistent and cohesive way.
Currently, federal gambling policy is dictated by politics, not policy.
For example, fantasy sports are exempted from the UIGEA without
serious discussion primarily because the NFL wanted the exemp-
tion. UIGEA passed without transparency or debate because a pow-
erful Kentucky Senator was playing to home state industry. The
DOJ was correct in questioning why horseracing "will be able to
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accept interstate wagers while other industries that are also regu-
lated by the states cannot." Trying to resolve contradictions in ex-
isting laws aside, this approach also would require a real review of
gambling including nuanced decisions regarding various forms of
gambling. Should all Internet games be illegal? What about chess
tournaments? If skill games should be excluded, what should be
the minimum skill required and how do you measure it? Do the
skills acquired through mastering poker justify its legality versus
games of pure chance? Should state lotteries be prohibited because
they experience disproportionate play by lower economic classes?
Is Congress willing to kill the horse race industry by taking away off
track betting? The list is long.
After that, the question remains whether the Federal Govern-
ment really wants to devote the resources and burden financial in-
stitutions to effectively implement prohibition. Certainly Senator
Bradley's arguments for passage of PASPA are no less relevant today
than they were in 1991. What is different, however, is the expanded
popularity of illegal wagering, the diminution of prosecutions for
that illegal activity and the media proliferation of wagering infor-
mation like the daily line that has been central to sports. Even if
Congress wanted to return to a policy of rigid enforcement, the
issue lingers over whether it would work. Does the Internet effec-
tively make enforcement of gambling laws impractical, particularly
in light of the reality that the United States' closest allies are more
likely to sue in the world trade courts than help it shut down for-
eign based gambling operators? If necessary, is the Federal Govern-
ment willing to make it illegal for a casual bettor to place a wager
and is it willing to violate the sanctity of its citizen's homes to make
arrests?
Finally, Congress must put aside politics that create paralysis
like simply being asked to resolve statutory interpretation conflicts
between the horseracing industry and the DOJ. It would also need
to stand up to powerful special interests that resulted in exceptions
for betting on the outcome of players performance but which make
it a felony to accept bets on the outcome of the same game in which
the player is a participant.
The second most obvious approach for federal gambling policy
to return to its historic roots is to use existing laws, like the Illegal
Gambling Business Act, the Travel Act and the Patriot Act, to truly
assist the states in enforcing state law. This eliminates the debate as
to the legality of the various forms of gambling under federal law
and return historical rights to the states to determine their gam-
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bling policies. It would legitimize the entire horse race wagering
industry and permit states to conduct online lotteries, casino games
and poker.
But, the existing laws are insufficient in an interactive world.
Federal law does assure the fairness of the distribution of wagering
revenue except as it relates to horseracing. Sports and sports wa-
gering are married. Athletes and teams are necessary for wagering
to exist. Therefore, compensation for wagering on these athletes
or teams should accrue to the athletes and teams. Moreover, some
of these revenues can be dedicated to improve the integrity of the
sports and minimize harmful impacts of the already pervasive wa-
gering in our society.
A modest proposal is that states shall have the right to sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize sports wagering
on the following conditions:
(a) Before a state licensed or operated sports book or
pool can accept a sports wager, the party accepting
such wager must obtain consent from:
(i) The league representing the owners of or col-
leges for the teams playing in the sporting event
or contest (or in the event of single athlete sports
with the athletes themselves), and
(ii) The gaming regulatory authority in the state
where the sports book or pool is located.
(b) As a condition of granting such consent, the league
may charge a fee not to exceed a reasonable amount,
such as one percent (1%) of each wager.
(c) In the case of professional team sports, the league
must obtain the consent and have a revenue sharing
agreement in place with the association representing
the athletes.
(d) A league may refuse consent for any reason.
(e) A set portion of all fees collected must be dedicated to
an enforcement program that protects the integrity of
the sport against any influences including gambling,
performance enhancing drugs or other unwanted
influences.
(f) A set portion of all fees collected shall be used placed
into a federally administered fund to provide supple-
mental health and life insurance to amateur and pro-
fessional athletes that have suffered sports related
injuries.
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(g) Any person accepting wagers must report the wager-
ing activity to the association or league in real time so
as to provide the association or league to analyze wa-
gering patterns that might indicate problems.
(h) A state licensed or operated sports book or pool can
only accept intrastate wagers that are made either in
person or through communication technologies that
verify that the point of sending and receiving the wa-
ger are in the authorized state.
(i) A state licensed or operated sports book or pool must
implement technologies or procedures approved by
the state to assure that minors are not permitted to
wager.
j) A person accepting wagers inconsistent with this law
shall be guilty of a federal crime.
This proposal offers many positive effects as a result. Sports
associations and leagues can make their own decisions as to
whether to permit wagering on their sporting events. If a sports
association or league decided to permit it, they would benefit from
the wagering. This is modeled after the IHA, which created reve-
nue sharing that has saved the industry. Without revenues from off-
track betting, probably 80% of all revenues would have been lost.
Profit sharing from sports wagers can then be used to support pro-
grams that better regulate the integrity of the sport. For example, if
the NCAA received 1% of all wagers made on college football, it
would receive about $600 million each year. If it devoted 10% of
this amount to policing college football, it would have a powerful
arsenal of $60 million annually to assure that the sport is free of
gambling, drugs, academic cheating and player payoffs. A 1% fee is
probably reasonable as licensed Nevada sports books retain on aver-
age about 5% of all wagers, so a 1% fee would equate to a 20% tax
on net revenues.
States can return to set their own gambling policies without
fear of Federal government intervention. Likewise, the state could
set up patron dispute resolution mechanisms, assure the honesty of
advertising and prevent abuse collection tactics. For example, a
state could make gambling debts uncollectable, but if made collect-
able would be enforced only through legal processes.
Licensed operators can be vetted prior to licensing and subject
to strict regulation and audits. Licensed operators would be able to
provide the type of information needed to help police the integrity
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of the games themselves. This would be in contrast to illegal book-
makers. Licensed operators also would pay taxes and provide em-
ployee benefits.
Federal prosecutors can then devote their limited resources to
assisting states that need help in enforcing their laws. With far less
illegal gambling and better resources through increased informa-
tion and taxation, the percentage of persons engaged in illegal
gambling and who are prosecuted can return to a reasonable num-
ber. Organized crime would be deprived of revenues that can be
used to finance other illegal activities. With less money going to
organized crime, general crime rates might decrease.
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